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Abstract—Smartphone apps can harvest very personal details
from the phone with ease. This is a particular privacy concern.
Unthinking installation of untrustworthy apps constitutes risky
behaviour. This could be due to poor awareness or a lack of know-
how: knowledge of how to go about protecting privacy. It seems
that Smartphone owners proceed with installation, ignoring any
misgivings they might have, and thereby irretrievably sacrifice
their privacy.
In this paper, we focus on the lack of know-how. Our primary
aim was to design a set of guidelines to help Smartphone owners
to judge whether apps are likely to respect their privacy or not. To
produce these we investigated the stances of those who do, to some
extent, have the requisite awareness and knowledge, namely those
with experience in IT security or computer science in general.
Such technically-adept people can reasonably be expected to
apply pattern-like heuristics when making installation decisions.
We carried out a study to identify and describe their heuristics.
We then distilled their app-related decision processes into a set
of easily accessible guidelines and we conclude the paper by
providing these.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are gaining prominence in many people’s
lives. As a consequence of their ubiquity and usefulness, they
accumulate large amounts of data, much of it sensitive and
personal.
The most commonly used Smartphone operating systems,
iOS and Android, implement mechanisms to ensure people are
informed of all data apps will gain access to. The Android OS
offers a list of app permissions during installation. iOS apps
request access to data during runtime, so that iPhone owners
have more fine-grained control than pre-Android 6.0 versions.
Furthermore, app developers are encouraged to present privacy
policies to the Smartphone owners that enumerate the types of
data being collected by the app, and to explain how this data
is stored and processed1.
Many Smartphone owners grant data access to apps that
effectively commit widespread privacy invasion [7]. For some
of them, the reason might be lack of awareness regarding
1https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP Mobile Security Project#Top
10 mobile controls and design principles, Section 7. Accessed 18.12.2015
privacy issues, so that they do not even see the need to protect
their privacy. Another group of users, however, might well be
motivated to protect themselves – and yet fail to do this due
to a lack of pertinent know-how.
People who extensively study, research or work in com-
puter science, on the other hand, can be expected to have the
requisite know-how. Although they might not necessarily have
the expertise to consider the social implications of privacy,
they can still protect themselves by applying their technical
knowledge to their own private Smartphone usage. We report
here how we went about uncovering the judgement heuristics
of the technically-adept. We wanted to elucidate the implicit
processes they applied when choosing to install Smartphone
apps, or not.
We distilled these into a simple and manageable set of
signposts which could be used to inform users’ app installation
decisions. Adopting even a subset of the listed heuristics can
be helpful. In addition to supporting Smartphone users, the
guidelines could also be helpful to certifiers or developers of
corporate policies, specifically those whose task it is to approve
Smartphone apps for corporate use.
II. STUDY METHODOLOGY
Here we describe the interview design and how we anal-
ysed the interviews.
A. Study Design
We conducted semi-structured interviews, the shortest of
which took 43 minutes, and the longest 78 minutes. The
interview was structured as follows:
a) Warm-up: First we asked the participants about their
experience and their current work. This was done in order
to estimate their level of technical knowledge and familiarity
with Smartphone privacy aspects. This question allowed us to
filter out those who lacked the requisite knowledge to con-
tribute to our heuristics collection. The remaining participants
demonstrated an understanding of privacy concepts and of the
measures that ought to be taken in order to protect privacy.
b) Demographics: We asked about the type of Smart-
phone they owned, and their usage thereof. We also asked them
how many apps they had on their Smartphones, and how often,
and on which occasions, they had installed them. We asked
about whether they had rooted or jailbroken their phones, and
their reasons for so doing, or refraining from so doing.
c) App installation: The main part of our interview
required participants to perform a task on their Smartphone.
They were asked twice to choose an app that they would install
on their Smartphone, and to comment on their thoughts during
the installation process. The participants were not required to
actually install the app; their task was merely to select the
app they would consider installing. We chose two types of
apps for this part. In the first task the participants were asked
to choose a Sudoku app, since such apps would normally
require few to no permissions. In the second task they were
asked to install a photo-editing app capable of some basic
functionality. We chose this type of app because apps of this
type tend to be rather complex and require a large number of
permissions. Some of these are mandatory in supporting their
basic functionality, others perhaps not. This would help us to
gain insight into how our participants behaved since the two
kinds of apps varied in terms of complexity and data privacy
aspects. After completion of the tasks, the interviewer asked
the participant to clarify the motivations for their choices.
d) Recommendations: The participants were asked to
give general recommendations related to app installation that
they would give to those without technical knowledge.
B. Recruitment
For the purposes of this study, we recruited participants
with experience in computer science, either in industry or
in academic research. While we focused on people with
knowledge in IT security, we also considered people from non-
security related computer science research areas, due to their
having more technical knowledge than the general population.
The participants were recruited via the snowball principle,
using emails sent to the departmental colleagues of the authors.
They were offered no reimbursement for their participation.
C. Participants
The study had 26 participants, all of whom were computer
scientists. Of these, 19 were working specifically in the field of
IT security, from theoretical cryptography to Android security.
The rest were from other computer science research areas,
such as computer linguistics and graphics. There were five
graduate or undergraduate students, 13 PhD students, five PhD
graduates working at the university, one PhD graduate working
in industry and two professors. The gender ratio was six
female and 20 male participants. Seventeen participants owned
Androids, eight owned iPhones, and one owned a Windows
Phone.
D. Analysis
The interviews were transcribed and analysed using an
open-coding approach. The goal was to identify privacy-related
heuristics that the participants either used themselves for app
search and installation, or recommended to others. For this,
specifically interview parts II-A0c and II-A0d were considered,
although in some cases some relevant heuristic was mentioned
by the participant earlier during the interview.
Each interview transcript was read by at least two authors.
Each composed a list of categories and subcategories of the
heuristics to classify the findings, which were then discussed
and agreed upon in the group. The (sub)categories were then
supplemented with the quotes from the interviews, translated
from German into English. Since our goal was to perform a
qualitative, instead of quantitative, analysis we did not count
the number of times each suggestion appeared in interviews.
We also did not include the heuristics that were clearly based
on concerns other than privacy, such as for example the color-
set of the interface.
III. RESULTS
We derived following categories of heuristics from our
analysis.
e) Permission-related: The heuristics in this category
rely on using the list of permissions that the app requests
as a basis for a decision. This category has following sub-
categories: judging whether permissions are reasonable and
judging whether permissions are acceptable.
f) Developer-related: The heuristics in the next cate-
gories focused on the developers, gauging their public image,
development process and the quality of related products. The
sub-categories are: judge the developers themselves, judge app
currency and judge based on related apps and services.
g) Socially-related: In this category, the heuristics are
based on social factors related to the app. The following
subcategories were derived: other people downloaded the app,
other people recommended the app, other people’s reviews and
other people’s ratings.
h) Avoidance techniques: The final category included
the heuristics that specifically focused on minimizing either
sensitive data exposure to the apps, or app usage altogether.
The subcategories are avoid apps, avoid data leakage and
avoid negative vibes.
We further identified some conflicting heuristics, whereby
the participants’ opinions differed on what action would be
more optimal for privacy or security assurance. Such discrep-
ancies could be grouped into following categories: rooting,
Apple vs. Google and using cloud services.
We elaborate on each one of these findings in sections that
follow.
IV. PERMISSION-RELATED HEURISTICS
App permissions were a strong theme. The types of data
access required by the app was considered an important factor
for deciding whether to install it.
A. Judging whether Permissions are Reasonable
The most commonly mentioned heuristic supporting the in-
stallation decision was whether the permissions that the app re-
quested made sense given the app’s purpose and functionality.
For this reason, many participants decided against installing an
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app, both Sudoku and photo editing, that required permissions
whose purpose did not match the app’s functionality.
Several heuristics have been proposed for deciding whether
some permission is appropriate for the app, or not. The most
straightforward of these was to identify permissions that are
necessary for the main functionality of the app. For the photo
editing app this was the permission to access stored photos.
“A photo editing app needs access to my photos to
be able to work.”
Other participants also examined the app description to
detect additional features which might warrant requesting a
particular extra permission. They could identify these fea-
tures either by reading the app description provided by the
developer, or they could try to figure it out themselves by
considering which features would be expected from this type
of apps.
“I would look at the app description, to find a reason
for those exceptional permissions. I mean, it could
be possible that there is a special function like being
able to recommend this app to friends and therefore
you would need to send emails to contacts from your
address book. If I could understand the process, so
that this wouldn’t be an automatic process, but an
extra feature, it would be ok.”
It was seen as an advantage if additional permissions, the
purpose of which was not self-evident, were explicitly moti-
vated in the app description. The app description was perceived
to be an opportunity for developers to provide explanations for
permission requests and was therefore examined carefully if a
permission request looked unnecessary.
“A Sudoku app normally doesn’t need my location
nor access to the Internet. Unless it provides a
significant added value. But, this must be explained
in the app description by the developer, since the
core functionality of a Sudoku-app isn’t to download
something from the net.”
B. Judging whether Permissions are Acceptable
1) Acceptable: In some cases, the participants were willing
to grant some permissions independent of the app functionality.
As such, the risk for allowing a concerning permission was ac-
cepted if the permission could be blocked by means of special
external tools, such as those provided by CyanogenMod2, an
alternative operating system.
“I do not generally have problems with this, because
I have also installed something that I can use to
block all the stuff. Namely, even if the app wants a
relatively high number of permissions, I simply block
the ones that I believe should not be granted.”
Participants mentioned other ways of preventing apps from
utilising granted permissions, such as turning off WiFi while
using an app, or closing the app running in the background
when it is no longer needed.
2http://www.cyanogenmod.org. Accessed 18.12.2015
“It is concerning that one can find out where I am,
but as far as I know it is only possible when the app
is on, and I kill apps that I no longer need”
“Then I uninstall it immediately. If I need it only for
this specific one time use, then it is not so simple to
get information, because I just turn off mobile data
and WiFi, then it cannot transmit data.”
Another reason for generally accepting some of the per-
missions was that the participants were not concerned with
the risks that particular permissions represented, due to either
not storing sensitive data that an app might access on their
phones, or generally finding it acceptable to reveal such data.
“I find In-App purchases non-critical, because I have
no credit card information there.”
In particular, one of the reasons not to be concerned was
that the shared information was likely to be deducible from
publicly available information anyway.
“...it would be much less pleasant than if it only
knew my location and where I was. Since one can
also find out in many other ways, that, for example,
I work in [anonymised]. Then it does not signify that
[the app] knows my location, or not.”
2) Unacceptable: Some participants mentioned that they
had never given particular permissions, or only rarely, in very
extreme circumstances. The kinds of permissions that fell into
this category were location data, details about phone calls,
contacts, and, in general, personal data about one’s family.
“For example, the photos of my family, access to
some E-Mail accounts or something. This is sensitive
data. Or some bank transactions. [...] Location also
belongs to very sensitive data. And whatever ID
means. [...] I try not to give any access there, as
much as is possible.”
V. DEVELOPER-RELATED HEURISTICS
The following quote shows that if one accepts permissions
that are essential to support the app’s main functionality there
is still the need to trust the developer’s integrity i.e that he is
not misusing the granted permissions for other purposes:
“...at the end of the day every permission is a certain
risk — do I accept the risk or do I have enough trust
that this permission is not going to be abused?”
Our participants judged the app developer using a number
of criteria. Most mentioned gaining a holistic impression of
seriousness or reliability of the developer, as derived from
different factors. While some of the factors are assessed
objectively, deriving the overall judgement is a complex task
and even the technically-adept sometimes have to rely on their
intuition.
“If my gut feeling tells me the developer is ok, I
would maybe do this, but with a bad gut feeling I
would definitely drop it.”
The enumerated factors and criteria are described in the
following subsections.
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A. Judge the Developers Themselves
1) Existing Reputation and Publicity: The most frequently
cited criteria was the developer’s reputation especially that of
the company. Being able to see the name of the developer,
especially if it was a big company or a long established brand,
was a positive aspect for most of our participants.
“I would recommend downloading apps developed
by well-known developers instead of run-of-the-mill-
developers, since well established developers proba-
bly have quality management under control and are
likely to fix bugs. Additionally the probability their
products contain malware is smaller.”
The participants mentioned different reasons why they see
positive aspects in this. First of all they assume that a big
company cannot afford to knowingly deliver malware and it
is less likely that they would risk their well-established brand
name by promoting an app that invades customer privacy since
a good reputation is a valuable yet fragile asset.
“... well-known companies can’t afford to knowingly
provide malware in their apps. This would ruin their
business.”
This is also connected with good experiences in the past
and on other platforms such as the PC. Brands that are known
for their reliability on other platforms are perceived to be more
likely to perform well on Smartphones.
“Yes, since Adobe is kind of an embodiment of photo
editing. It is a well established brand.”
Although a known name is a positive sign some of our
participants also mentioned that just knowing the brand, on
its own, is insufficient. They mentioned that they searched
for more details even if they knew the developer or his/her
company. This applied especially to apps with extensive per-
mission requests since in this case trust in the reliability of the
developer was crucial.
“So ... if I just heard the name once, I examine them
more closely. Initially I didn’t trust any developer
... trust will build up while checking him. This,
of course, didn’t result in not installing apps from
unknown developers at all. This app with the cow,
this to-do app, I have no clue who developed it but it
didn’t request extensive permissions so this was ok.”
Also often mentioned as being important was that national-
ity of the developer. Some participants specifically mentioned
trusting German developers more since the German Data
Protection Act is more restrictive and overall privacy is given
more consideration in Germany than in other countries.
“I would normally take a closer look at the developer
of the software. Especially if it is sensitive data ...
hm ... Here I maybe would say, a German developer
is more trustworthy to me than a foreign one, since
privacy plays a really important role in Germany as
compared to other countries.”
Participants also mentioned concerns about developers us-
ing servers in countries with opaque Privacy Acts such as
China or Russia.
“Whether the developer’s name seems trustworthy to
me ... hm ... this depends on which data it requests.
Also which servers are contacted in the background.
I’m no friend of apps that communicate with some
Russian servers. Maybe a bit uninspired ... or some
Chinese servers, no offence, but I would prefer my
data remain on German servers or American or so.”
Last, but not least, the impact of past events, especially a
privacy or security related event, made participants reconsider
the reliability of a developer. This goes for the app in question
but also the associated brand or company.
“Maybe one can recall another piece of software
about which one has heard something negative.
Maybe it had some security holes or something like
that. If the same company produces this app I could
assume maybe there also is such a risk.”
“I would guess it would be in the news, because such
things, like big apps publishing your data without
telling you, always makes a good story. Therefore
I would expect that if something comes to light, I
think we had this with WhatsApp a couple of times,
then I would sooner or later read about it in the
newspaper.”
2) Developer’s Webpage Content: Checking the devel-
oper’s web page was considered a crucial part of the assess-
ment process. The layout and content of a developer’s page
provides, analogous to the app description, objective informa-
tion such as manuals, tutorials and privacy terms as well as
subjective information about the quality of service provided by
the application. Some of our participants mentioned that they
associate a poor quality web page with a likelihood of a lower
quality app.
“You also get a certain feeling whether quality is
a concern to this developer or not if you check
the layout of the web page. Since this is the public
representation of the company ... if this is carelessly
designed I would assume they are working carelessly
and therefore their software is also produced without
care.”
For some participants, one of the important parts of the
web page was the presence of privacy-related terms. The mere
existence of documentation about data usage was considered
essential. Even if no data was collected and transmitted by an
app, such a document ought to exist.
“If they didn’t write anything about data privacy,
I would drop it. If they wrote something awkward
there, I would drop it. Even if they don’t collect
anything they could afford to write a single sentence
‘We do not collect any data.’ and that’s it, matter
straightened out. If they don’t do it I’m better off.”
Sometimes seeing privacy terms was not considered suffi-
cient. In these cases the content was carefully perused. They
searched for data leakage which is not considered necessary
for providing the service itself and therefore goes beyond their
own expectations.
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“I would search for something awkward, in partic-
ular for data usage over and above the expected.
Namely, if they write that they store my mail address
and all data you send while contacting us it is ok.
Or, if they store my pictures while I use their cloud
services. These are things which are necessary in
order to provide the service itself. Besides I can’t
determine how the stored data is processed from a
technical point of view. If I want to use their services,
the ease of the cloud, I have to provide my data, this
is no problem. But if they collect data which is not
directly linked to the service itself, this should be a
warning. This activates a red flashing in my head.”
Moreover participants also considered additional features
on the web page to be a positive sign. These include bulletin
boards, newsgroups or the opportunity to get in touch with the
developers to request new features or give feedback to already-
implemented ones. This applies especially to more complex
apps.
“If it is Software which is difficult to use or has
a long feature list, I would search for manuals
or something like this. It is also useful if there
is a bulletin board where users can ask questions
or a newsgroup. Or the possibility to contact the
developers, maybe to request new features or so.”
As a motivation for installing an app, some participants also
mentioned not only their own goals and privacy concerns, but
also their willingness to encourage some particular developer
behaviour.
“In principle, one can also make a Sudoku app
completely without permissions. This is, of course,
a bad business model, so, when someone is so nice,
then it is good, I would gladly support this by
installing this app.”
B. Judge App Currency
In the assessment of developer reliability questions about
maintenance were considered by our participants. Since soft-
ware can potentially have bugs and security holes, a regular
patching and updating philosophy seemed crucial. Therefore
participants checked the recency of the last update.
“... this was last updated on the 20th of January
2015. This one, on the contrary, was last updated
on the 10th of February 2013, so it is significantly
older and obviously no longer maintained. Maybe
this would be the criteria.”
C. Judge Based on Related Apps and Services
Last, but not least, an assessment of other products by
the same developer was mentioned. This goes especially for
unknown developers. Participants check whether other apps in
the marketplace exist and have good ratings and reviews or
other users complain about their products.
“There you can check the ratings and reviews ... hm
... and how much apps they published.”
“... if it is from an unknown developer, I check the
Internet whether I can find something about it or if
other users complain about their products”
VI. SOCIALLY-RELATED HEURISTICS
Common methods for estimating the app trustworthiness
involved looking at social feedback: unfamiliar usage, peer-
usage, reviews, ratings, experts or media reports. Almost all
participants mentioned at least one of the six so we can
conslude that they account for a large proportion of the
deployed heuristics.
A. Other People Downloaded the App
A heuristic shared by a large number of the participants was
the number of downloads. The more downloads an app has,
the more trustworthy the participants considered it to be. The
rationale behind this assumption was the “self-cleaning pro-
cess” of the appstore. Untrustworthy apps would be removed
before it could amass a large number of downloads. The large
number of downloads suggest that there is “no problem”.
“Regarding the apps, that are popular and down-
loaded a lot, yes, I would trust that there would be
some people who would notice any [privacy issues]”
B. Other People Recommend the App
Participants often asked friends for advice, especially when
they had specific functionality in mind. Soliciting recommen-
dations when the participants consider their own knowledge to
be insufficient seems a popular heuristic.
“So, for me it would be nice to have a recommenda-
tion from a competent friend, or it does not have to
be a friend, just a competent person, where I think
that he watches out for the kinds of things I would
watch out for.”
C. Other People’s Reviews
Reviews from other app users tend to inform many partici-
pants. In particular, some specifically searched for mention of
privacy-related issues.
“But if there is something like, for example, real
malware, where someone had noticed, while having
a firewall on his phone, that the app tries to send
data to some server that has nothing to do with what
the app does, this would be, for me, a criterion to
reconsider whether to install such an app.”
Alternatively, when the participants themselves were not
sure whether the requested permissions were reasonable, they
scanned the reviews to gauge the opinions of others.
“For example, when the app wants to access different
things, if reviewers say this makes no sense [...] then
I do not like this at all. [...] Since I am sometimes
not so sure myself, in terms of what makes sense and
what does not, and when many people write that it
makes no sense to access this, then it is something
negative for me.”
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Keeping an eye out for “bad reviews” seemed to be a
helpful strategy for some of the participants. They mentioned
focusing on these to detect a worst-case scenario. If this worst-
case scenario did not contain anything “terrible”, they would
go ahead and install the app.
“Well I find it interesting to know when people
give really bad reviews, whether they are based on
something fundamental or not.”
Some participants consulted usability reviewers’ reports to
inform their decisions.
“What could be of interest too are the number
of advertisements displayed, just from of usability
perspective, well advertisements are the one thing
that mostly ruins usability.”
Numerous participants considered forums and other online
communities to be a valuable source of information.
“One should take [the app], because the crypto
community says it is good. [...] So that, at the end
of the day, one knows what is the right one, and one
has to dig through a bunch of forums and articles
and blogs...”
Others mentioned specific websites they visited while look-
ing for an app. On the one hand writers on such websites
are expected to have a deeper and broader knowledge. On
the other hand, time-consuming comparisons between different
apps are outsourced to such websites because of their presumed
knowledge and the person’s own lack of time to do this
themselves.
“In general I would simply search online for apps.
Looking for some bulletin boards or maybe you find
something on well-known pages such as CHIP which
lists such apps. These are trustworthy.”
D. Other People’s Ratings
App ratings e.g. the number of stars in the Android
Appstore, was relied on by some participants.
“I would expect that some kind of crowd intelligence
would also become apparent in the ratings, if some
app is not recommended. Also when most of the users
do not seem to care about security.”
E. Contact Developer
Finally, if all these sources did not prove sufficient to
support a decision some participants would contact the app
developers directly.
“I would ask the developer [...] but most likely I
would try to get in contact.”
VII. AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES
Some of the heuristics focused specifically on avoidance,
where participants chose either to minimize usage of apps
(either overall, or of apps of certain kind), prevent wholesale
leakage of data, and generally avoiding negative intuitive feel-
ings they might get from apps. The following were mentioned:
A. Avoid Apps
1) Minimise App Installation: Most apps require some
permissions, potentially accessing sensitive data. This could
be misused. Some participants recommended minimising these
risks by having only essential apps on their phones.
“I only install apps when I really have a very
concrete feeling, that it would help me [...] just
consider if I really need this app.”
To keep track of all apps, some recommended filtering out
those that are no longer in use.
“It would also be good to delete unnecessary apps
from time to time”
2) Look for Privacy-Sensitive Alternatives: Since evaluat-
ing the validity of requested permissions can requires effort,
some suggested minimising this effort by choosing apps that
are less complex, have less functionality, and thus request
access to less data.
“Now with these big apps with 21 features, in this
situation one cannot decide, whether the permissions
are really alright or not. Then, I mean, in most cases
it is possible, that there is an app, that can do only 3
things, and one of them is what I want to do. These
are simpler to check. ”
“Therefore the recommendation would be, when you
are unsure, try to find a simpler App that is not such
a huge thing, but does what you want. ”
3) Avoid Free Apps: Although many participants admitted
never, or seldom, paying for apps and preferring free alterna-
tives, several acknowledged that free apps might collect more
data than those that one paid for. Some were willing to pay
for apps in exchange for the privacy they thought this would
give them.
“I would, in any case, rather buy an app, in order
to free myself from the permissions, than accept too
many permissions.”
B. Avoid Data Leakage
Some participants suggested storing their personal and
sensitive data somewhere less vulnerable, such as on their PC.
“or even better, do not store photos there, or, if
possible, transfer them. [...] then I can store them
on my PC so that they are there but i still can use
the [app].
As a radical solution, some participants proposed using
a second device for this purpose, one that did not contain
any sensitive data on it. This suggestion, albeit not practical
for many, was indeed a viable solution, particularly for those
participants who worked on Smartphone security and therefore
had a variety of test devices available to them.
“Or, get yourself a second Smartphone and install
everything on it, since it would not make any differ-
ence”
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C. Avoid Negative Vibes
Some participants admitted relying mainly on their intu-
ition, formed by their technically-rich experiences, informing
their security-related decisions.
“This is a feeling I get as a computer scientist.”
Such an approach is used for various tasks, such as
evaluating the appropriateness of permissions requested by the
app, or the trustworthiness of the developer while assessing the
privacy terms.
“Yes, the privacy policies are mostly so confusing, I
do not normally read them through. So, it is mostly
an intuitive decision.”
“For me, it would be my intuition. And I mean, I
have also programmed a lot of Android apps, and
grappled with these permissions, therefore I know
what is needed for what.”
VIII. DISAGREEMENTS
Participants mostly agreed, or at least did not contradict
each other, but some differing opinions were voiced. These
are discussed in this section.
1) Rooting: A number of participants had rooted or jail-
broken their Smartphones. Several also claimed that it helped
them to protect their privacy. For example, they could install
a firewall or permissions-blocking software that would not be
possible on non-rooted devices:
“With it I actually wanted to install a firewall, for
example, and for the apps that restrict the execution
of other apps one needs root access.”
Others, however, held the opinion, that rooting delivered
no significant advantages, and could actually harm the device’s
security by opening up vulnerabilities.
“I do not want to introduce security loopholes. [...]
And when I say that an app has the possibility of
getting root access, then it is already a lower level
of security than to say, I have an operating system,
that gives no one root access.”
2) Apple vs. Google: Not surprisingly, the iPhone and
Android users differed in their opinions, in terms of whether
Apple or Google was less or more likely to infringe their
privacy. An argument for better privacy of Android was its
openness and transparency, at least relative to Apple products.
“...then there was Apple, but they have such a
restrictive policy, we decide what you do with your
phone... I did not like it very much, and the Android
phones were then very open.”
On the other hand, it was mentioned that Apple, as opposed
to Google, gets its main revenue from sources other than data
collection, and therefore is likely to collect and share less data
than Google.
“Apple earns its money not with address data and
similar stuff[...] I would assume, Apple does not
share the data that they have with other companies.
”
3) Using Cloud-Services: Some participants were con-
cerned about using cloud-services, perhaps for sharing pictures
or organizing and syncing a calendar because of privacy
concerns. One way to avoid this is to host your own server
with cloud-services to maintain control over all the data.
“The point is, some of my data I wouldn’t transfer to
the outside world, but this depends on the data type.
Some data is destined for public, so these can be
stored anywhere but other things definitely not. [...] I
have different apps which communicate with my own
infrastructure at home. Such things like OwnCloud.
Data isn’t destined for foreign infrastructures, just
for things like OwnCloud.”
“... if this app states: ‘Hey I will store nothing locally
but everything in the cloud.’ This is really annoying.
Such things must be decided by me alone.”
Some participants trusted well-established companies such
as Google or Amazon since there would be a dedicated team
responsible for security. This would minimise risks such as
hacking and hardware malfunctions:
“Too much work. I mean, it is part of the functional-
ity, that there is someone who maintains the system.
Someone who works on such things such as backups
and such things, all those annoying things I would
have to deal with otherwise. And for this my data is
an acceptable price.”
IX. FURTHER FINDINGS
A. Misconceptions
Even people with an advanced degree, or many years of
experience, are not immune to misconceptions. This can easily
occur via updates of the operating system or components
thereof where unnoticed changes occur. For example the
changes made by Google to the permission visualisation and
grouping with Play Store Version 4.8.19 [8] which among other
things removed the listing for Internet access from the pop-up
permission list.
“I have looked for an app without access to the
Internet, since Sudoku doesn’t need such access and
if it has, then the developer has to motivate this very
well. Maybe to load new Sudokus, but even this isn’t
required since Sudokus could be generated offline.”
Another reason for such misconceptions could be transfer
effects from other platforms as some participants assume that
WindowsPhone 8.1 would display a pop-up if an app requests
access to some sensitive resources such as the microphone or
the camera. In fact each platform uses their own approach.
“I think he [the operating system] will ask me before
installing whether I want to confirm such permis-
sions or not, but this app doesn’t request any. I mean
access to the camera or my contacts or something
like this. Such permissions will be requested, but this
app doesn’t need them.”
We also found a misconception regarding app testing. Some
participants assume that trialing the app only costs them time
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but in reality the app, while being trialled, accesses all the data
and data leakage is possible even if it is un-installed after a
few minutes.
“Hm ... yes .. first I would test the free one. It just
cost me a couple of minutes to download.”
“Probably I just have to install and test them. Would
have cost me just a little time.”
Some participants considered the risk of virus and malware
to be low since Smartphones are not as ubiquitous as, for exam-
ple, Windows PCs. This led them to believe that hackers would
not produce viruses for these platforms. In 2014 around one
point two billion Smartphone devices were sold worldwide3,
which is about four times the number of PCs sold in the same
time period4. So this belief is misguided.
“In the past nearly everyone used a Windows PC, so
it was profitable [to program a virus], but for MAC
there were no viruses because of that for a long time.
And now with Smartphones [...] the risk is relatively
low because of the different operating systems on the
market.”
Such examples illustrate that no one knows everything
or unfailingly makes perfect decisions, not even those who
consider themselves expers in computing. General expert
knowledge of a domain, for example in our study general IT
and security knowledge, can even be a handicap if it leads
to over-confidence. Since the technically-adept probably know
how to recover from adverse events they are sometimes equally
likely to throw caution to the wind [16]. Acknowledging the
human propensity for misattribution, suggestibility and bias is
crucial.
B. Social Pressure
As social pressure sometimes plays a role in the decision
process for laymen [17], even the technically-adept are not
immune. Our participants cited pressure from friends or peers
as a motivation for installing an app without checking for
privacy issues or installing despite privacy reservations. In the
following quote, the participant mentions installing WhatsApp
messenger despite his concerns:
“...there was a colleague from abroad. He came to
visit and said he wanted to communicate with me,
and then I said: Fine, if it really needs to be.
X. DERIVING GUIDELINES
The following guidelines were and selected by three dif-
ferent factors, starting with only adding guidelines which
were mentioned by at least one participants. Additionally we
subjectively rated their practicability (e.g. a second device or
special device isn’t practicable for everyone) and effectiveness
respectively plausibility (e.g. checking for interface colours is
not useful guideline).
When participants were asked to give advice to privacy-
unaware users, several of them focused on risk. The advice
3http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2996817. Accessed 18.12.2015
4http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2960125, Accessed 18.12.2015
was generally to think about one’s attitude toward privacy, and
what consequences data sharing could lead to.
“One has to make up some rules, so that one can
say: no, this is too much [data sharing for me].”
“But [the user] should, in any case, extensively
consider what relates to security. [...] he should in
any case pay attention, that that data, that is being
shared, would pose no problem to him.”
Several participants pointed to the importance of under-
standing exactly what the permissions mean, either by reading
the descriptive text, or, if required, searching for further
information via Google or by asking an expert.
“It would help to read, I mean, most [of the per-
missions] are explained correctly, it is written there,
for example, can access these files, or, for example,
read phone call status, and to whom the call was
placed and something like that. So, just read and
think about it using common sense, and, if needed,
search the web.”
A. Guidelines
Fig. 1. Heuristics to Decide on Installation
Based upon our findings (Figure 1) and informed by the
participants’ recommendations, we were able to derive a list
of guidelines for supporting users’ privacy-related decisions
concerning Smartphone apps. We first introduce the risk anal-
ysis concept, as this is what the users need to do before
they can estimate the privacy of specific apps. Then we
present a set of recommendations to inform their evaluation
of the risk related to choosing and installing an app. Finally,
we present guidelines on how to manage the apps already
installed, in order to minimize unnecessary data exposure.
Reference is made to the corresponding heuristic(s) for each
recommendation.
Some of the identified heuristics are excluded from our
recommendations, due to their being applicable only in specific
use cases, mostly being applicable only to technically-trained
Smartphone owners, those working in mobile development
(VII-B, VII-C), or those expressing individual preferences
(V-A2).
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1) General Risk Analysis: As, ultimately, making a
privacy-sensitive decision depends on subjective preferences,
especially in private Smartphone usage, it is important for users
to be able to conduct a rudimentary risk analysis. The steps
could be summarised in following way:
1) Consider and take note of the data the app wants to
collect. Note what exactly the individual app permis-
sions mean. If it is not clear from the description, look
for further sources of information. Trusted websites,
your peers or experts are all good sources of advice.
It is worth reading up so that your privacy-related
knowledge is current. (X)
2) Think about the possible consequences if particular
types of data are shared. Try to imagine potential
scenarios if some information, such as photos stored
on the device were to become public or fall into the
hands of some malicious person. (X)
Deciding which of these consequences are acceptable
as a trade-off for the benefits the app provides. De-
pending on your privacy stance, you might choose to
share as little data as possible, or you might be willing
to trade privacy in exchange for desired functionality
or reduced monetary costs to some extent. (IV-B2,
VII-A3, VII-A1)
2) App-Specific Guidelines: The following methods could
be used to estimate the risk presented by individual apps. The
process outlined in Section X-A1 then serves as a basis to
decide whether the risk is acceptable, or not.
Note that while many of these methods are general enough
to be applicable to different mobile operating systems, some
require different approaches. As such, while the Android user
can always see the permissions required by the app prior to
installation, this information might be more difficult to come
by in iOS. Even though their might be changes in the operating
systems e.g. new permission system in Android 6, most of the
generic guidelines remain applicable. Checking the permission
list beforehand still is important as runtime checking might
lead to new mistakes e.g. miscalculating permission interac-
tion.
B. Participants’ Recommendations
These guidelines enumerate helpful preventative measures
that will reduce the risk of app-related privacy violation.
1) Check whether the permissions are suitable to enable
app functionality. In the best case, the only permis-
sions requested by the app would be the ones that are
necessary for its basic functionality. For example, one
can expect a photo editing app to request access to
photos. (IV-A)
If the app offers extended features requiring ad-
ditional permissions, one has to consider whether
these permissions are still acceptable, or whether
one should look for alternative apps requiring fewer
permissions. If an app requires permissions that do
not match the functionality this should raise alarms.
(IV-A, VII-A2)
2) Seek out apps with larger user base: check the
number of downloads and ratings in the app store.
(VI-A, VI-D)
3) Look whether apps are being actively developed;
check the last update date. This makes it more likely
that the detected security vulnerabilities are corrected
as they are revealed. (V-B)
4) Read app reviews, especially negative ones, to check
whether they mention privacy issues, such as inappro-
priate permissions or some other kind of suspicious
behaviour. It might also be helpful to check feedback
outside of the app store by going to dedicated web-
sites or forums, or consulting knowledgeable peers.
(VI-C, VI-C, VI-B)
5) Research the app developer. You could check their
website. The following factors might indicate that the
developer is trustworthy:
a) the developer is well-established, with sev-
eral apps and large userbases, (V-C)
b) the developer’s residence is in a country that
has privacy protection laws, (V-A1)
c) the developer is a big company that values
its reputation, (V-A1)
d) the developer puts a privacy policy statement
either on their website or in the app descrip-
tion. (V-A2)
6) Pay attention to media reports related to Smartphone
privacy, since popular apps could be exposed if they
violate privacy (V-A1).
1) App-Management Guidelines: Besides the recommen-
dations to improve privacy awareness before installation, par-
ticipants also provided recommendations related to the usage
of installed apps.
1) If the app is installed, try to minimize data sharing.
You could move sensitive data to a more secure stor-
age venue, or ensure that the app does not continue to
run in the background after it is no longer required.
You could also turn off the Internet connection while
using the app, so as to prevent it from harvesting your
data. (IV-B, VII-B)
2) Regularly review all installed apps. Identify those
that you no longer use, and remove them. (VII-A1)
XI. RELATED WORK
A number of guidelines, either from government agencies
or from private corporations, provide privacy advice to Smart-
phone owners [3], [4], [11]. These suggestions are either aimed
at corporate Smartphone use or provide general information
rather than giving specific step by step app installation advice.
Several studies have been carried out to investigate mobile
privacy perceptions [15], [5], [14]. In particular, the studies
carried out by [6], [7], [12], [2] focused on identifying mental
models of the permission system in common mobile operating
systems. The study in the last citation showed that, for laypeo-
ple, the impact of permission requests to support informed
decision making appears rather inefficient. Even the addition
of additional text warnings delivered no statistically significant
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effect in terms of improving the impact of a permission warn-
ing. Other heuristics, such as an app’s download count, seem
more influential in terms of informing decision making. Some
studies have investigated privacy perceptions in general [1],
[13]. The reasons for users failing to deploy privacy-protecting
mechanisms were identified using qualitative interviews in [17]
with poor usability and lack of knowledge being considered
major causatives. In [8] the changes made by Google to
the Android permission visualization in the Play Store App
were analyzed. Some major usability and understandability
problems were identified.
An investigation into security expert attitudes and practices
with respect to computer security was reported by [9]. The
authors drew comparisons between the behaviour of experts
and laypeople. They identified discrepancies between mea-
sures of privacy protection experts and non-experts deployed.
A qualitative study, focusing on mental models of Internet
security of experts as well as laymen, was conducted in [10].
This study found few differences between the behaviours of
experts and non-experts. Given these conflicting findings it is
clear that this topic merits more attention.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
Even if the users are motivated to protect their privacy
on Smartphones, they might have difficulties making right
decisions in their everyday usage without sufficient knowledge.
Therefore, we set out to understand how technically-adept
people reasoned about app installation so that we could derive
guidelines to support these users.
We conducted interviews with technically-adept people
with experience in computer science, the majority of whom
were also working or doing research in in IT security, in
order to identify their heuristics in terms of app installation.
By performing a qualitative analysis of the interviews, we
identified a number of deployed heuristics. We were then able
to derive a set of guidelines for Smartphone owners.
Several discrepancies and misunderstandings emerged from
our analysis and a further study should explore these in more
depth. Future work will also determine the viability of these
recommendations via user studies.
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